How Moscow Systematically Violated Peace and Security Commitments Since 1992
From promises of nuclear security to ceasefire deals, Russia has made — and broken — countless international agreements over the past three decades. This article outlines the Kremlin’s documented pattern of violating peace treaties, territorial assurances, and ceasefire agreements — exposing a strategy built on calculated bad faith and imperial revanchism. From Chechnya to Ukraine, from Georgia to Moldova, the evidence paints a clear picture: Russia breaks contracts when it suits its strategic aims.
I. Ukraine and the Budapest Memorandum (1994–Present)
In 1994, Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum, receiving written assurances from Russia, the US, and the UK to respect its independence and territorial integrity.
Yet:
- In 2006, Russia weaponized energy supplies by cutting off gas to Ukraine.
- In 2014, it annexed Crimea, breaching core tenets of the agreement.
- In 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion, targeting Kyiv and seizing large parts of eastern and southern Ukraine.
These actions shredded the memorandum and demonstrated that Moscow treats international treaties as tools of convenience rather than binding commitments.
But the betrayal of Ukraine did not come from Russia alone. The United States, United Kingdom, and France, as signatories to the Budapest Memorandum, also gave explicit security assurances to Ukraine in exchange for its nuclear disarmament. These commitments included support through the United Nations Security Council and refraining from the use or threat of force. Yet, when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in 2022, none of the guarantor countries provided the immediate, binding military response that the spirit of the memorandum implied. Instead, Ukraine was left to fight alone in the early days of invasion, exposing the fragility of these international assurances.
This abandonment shattered the notion that security could be guaranteed through diplomacy alone. Instead of mobilizing a multinational defense under treaty obligations, the West responded with sanctions, military aid, and political support — but only after Ukraine had already suffered territorial losses and mass casualties. France and Germany, too, undermined their credibility through the Minsk process, often pressing Ukraine to make concessions while failing to constrain Russian aggression. These actions reinforced the perception that Western powers preferred conflict containment over enforcement, and prioritized geopolitical stability over justice for violated commitments.
As a result, the notion of a new “security guarantee” for Ukraine — whether proposed by NATO members or through so-called peace frameworks — is now met with justified skepticism in Kyiv and among Ukraine’s allies. The lesson learned is clear: a guarantee not backed by automatic military action is no guarantee at all. Without enforceable deterrents and clearly defined consequences, any future agreement risks becoming another diplomatic illusion — like the many before it that Russia and others have freely ignored.
The Orange Revolution of 2004 was a landmark moment in Ukraine’s democratic evolution, sparked by massive public protests after widespread reports of electoral fraud in favor of pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych. International observers, including the OSCE, confirmed the election had been marred by vote-rigging, intimidation, and media manipulation. The Ukrainian Supreme Court ordered a re-run of the election, which pro-EU candidate Viktor Yushchenko won — a decision widely upheld as legitimate under both Ukrainian and international law.
Despite this, a persistent myth among some American and pro-Kremlin circles claims Yanukovych was illegally ousted. In truth, his eventual fall in 2014 came not through a foreign coup, but after he fled the country during the Euromaidan uprising, amid police violence, corruption scandals, and mass defections from his own government.
His refusal to sign an EU association agreement, under Russian pressure, triggered a wave of public outrage — a popular, not externally imposed, demand for democratic alignment with Europe. Ukraine’s pro-European path emerged from grassroots demand for reform, not Western coercion.
II. Crimea, The Minsk Agreements and Deception
The 2014 annexation of Crimea was not only a blatant violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty, but also a calculated exercise in deception by the Russian state. In late February 2014, heavily armed men in unmarked green uniforms began occupying strategic sites across Crimea — including airports, military bases, and the regional parliament. These operatives, later dubbed “little green men,” were initially denied by Moscow, with President Putin publicly claiming they were “local self-defense forces.” Russian officials flatly rejected any military involvement, attempting to cloak a state-sponsored invasion as an internal uprising.
However, the lie unraveled quickly. The soldiers’ equipment matched standard issue Russian military gear, their movements were synchronized with Russian naval assets, and their operations displayed coordination beyond any irregular militia. Within weeks, Russia had organized a sham referendum under military occupation, used the result to justify annexation, and officially admitted — retroactively — that its troops had led the operation. Putin later confessed on state TV that he had personally overseen the Crimean takeover, fully aware of its illegality under international law.
This episode exposed the Kremlin’s strategy of plausible deniability paired with information warfare. It set a precedent for how Russia would later operate in Donbas and elsewhere: deny, distort, deploy — then demand recognition of the new reality it had violently created. The annexation of Crimea shattered any lingering hope that Putin’s regime could be trusted as a rational actor on the world stage. It marked a turning point where lies became tools of statecraft, and international norms were cast aside in favor of expansion through force and fraud.
Following Russia’s covert war in Donbas in 2014, the Minsk I and II agreements attempted to establish peace. But Russia and its proxies violated ceasefires within days of signing, undermining the entire process. Temporary “harvest” and “holiday” truces collapsed repeatedly due to continued shelling and attacks.
This cycle of signing agreements and breaching them shows how Russia used diplomacy as cover for military aggression.
III. Chechnya: From Peace Treaties to Brutal War
Russia’s violent relationship with Chechnya is one of the earliest post-Soviet examples of its refusal to respect peace agreements or self-determination.
Following the Soviet Union’s collapse, Chechnya declared independence in 1991, sparking the First Chechen War (1994–1996). After suffering significant military losses, Russia signed the Khasavyurt Accord in 1996 and a formal peace treaty in 1997, which included a mutual pledge of non-aggression and laid the foundation for normalized relations. But just two years later, Vladimir Putin — newly rising within the Kremlin — used unrest and staged provocations to justify launching the Second Chechen War in 1999.
This second campaign was marked by extreme brutality, with Grozny reduced to rubble, tens of thousands of civilians killed, and widespread allegations of war crimes, torture, and disappearances. Russia painted the war as a fight against terrorism, but its primary goal was reasserting control over the separatist republic. The war was a deliberate violation of previous peace deals, with the Kremlin deciding that Chechnya’s independence — however de facto — could not be tolerated. The indiscriminate use of force demonstrated that Moscow viewed peace treaties not as binding commitments, but as temporary pauses until military dominance could be re-established.
By the early 2000s, Chechnya was crushed into submission, and Moscow installed a loyal strongman — Ramzan Kadyrov — who continues to rule the region through fear and repression. The Chechen experience reveals how Russia’s so-called “peace” is often enforced through terror and dictatorship. It also underscores how the Kremlin’s strategy is not merely to defeat enemies militarily, but to erase their political aspirations entirely, even after formally recognizing them.
Chechnya remains a warning to other regions and nations: any peace deal with Russia is fragile unless backed by force, oversight, and accountability.
IV. Georgia: Occupation After Agreements
Russia’s interference in Georgia began under the pretense of peacekeeping in the early 1990s, following ethnic conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Through the Sochi Agreements (1992–1993), Russia positioned itself as a mediator while simultaneously supporting separatists with arms, troops, and intelligence. Russian “peacekeepers” effectively acted as enablers of secession, undermining Georgia’s sovereignty and creating frozen conflicts that served Moscow’s strategic interests. These early interventions were dressed in diplomatic language, but in practice, they laid the groundwork for direct military aggression.
The situation escalated dramatically in August 2008, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Georgia under the guise of protecting South Ossetia. After five days of intense fighting, Russian forces occupied both Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Moscow unilaterally recognized them as independent states — a move condemned by most of the international community. To this day, Russia maintains a military occupation in these regions, effectively redrawing borders through force. Georgia’s experience confirmed what Ukraine would later learn: Russia manipulates ceasefires and peace processes not to solve conflicts, but to prolong them, militarize them, and eventually dominate them.
V. Moldova: The Forgotten Occupation of Transnistria
In Moldova, Russia’s military intervention dates back to 1992, when it supported separatists during the Transnistrian War by deploying units of its 14th Army. Though a ceasefire was reached, Russia never withdrew its troops, despite repeated calls from Moldovan authorities and international bodies. To this day, Russia maintains a military presence in Transnistria, a breakaway region it effectively controls — in clear violation of Moldova’s sovereignty. This long-standing occupation, cloaked in the rhetoric of peacekeeping, reveals another pattern: Russia embeds its forces under the guise of stabilization and uses them to exert permanent influence and obstruct integration with the West.
VI. Syria: Military Intervention Beyond Its Borders
Russia’s intervention in Syria began in 2015 under the banner of fighting terrorism, but in reality, it was a strategic move to preserve the Assad regime, secure military footholds in the Middle East, and reassert Russia’s global influence. Deploying airpower, special forces, and naval assets, Moscow claimed to target ISIS, but consistently bombed opposition-held civilian areas, hospitals, and infrastructure. The intervention shifted the balance of power, allowing Assad to survive politically and militarily — at the cost of tens of thousands of civilian lives and the prolongation of Syria’s humanitarian catastrophe.
Through its actions, Russia demonstrated not just geopolitical opportunism, but a complete disregard for international humanitarian law. It repeatedly used veto power at the UN to shield Assad from accountability, while its own forces were implicated in war crimes, including the indiscriminate bombing of Aleppo and Idlib. Syria became a testing ground for Russian weapons, tactics, and propaganda — showcasing how Moscow wages war through brute force, disinformation, and diplomatic obstruction. Far from stabilizing the region, Russia’s role in Syria entrenched authoritarianism and normalized impunity for mass atrocities.
VII. Africa: Strategic Expansion Through Security Deals
In recent years, Russia has steadily expanded its military presence across Africa, exploiting instability and power vacuums to gain influence under the guise of security cooperation. Initially operating through Wagner Group mercenaries, Russia’s activities in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, and Niger involved training regimes, securing mining concessions, and suppressing dissent. These interventions were typically informal and deniable, but their impact was profound: empowering authoritarian leaders, fueling violence, and eroding democratic norms. Wagner’s operations have been linked to war crimes, civilian massacres, and resource exploitation — revealing how Russia exports repression alongside weapons.
Following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin, the Kremlin consolidated these operations under a new structure: the Africa Corps, a formal entity tied directly to the Russian Ministry of Defense. This evolution signals a shift from covert interference to overt militarization, where Russia now deploys uniformed troops and official envoys to cement its influence. The strategy echoes its post-Soviet pattern: embed militarily, extract economically, and erode sovereignty — all while claiming to provide “stability.” Russia’s African campaign underscores a broader global ambition to reshape regional balances of power through force, fear, and state-backed manipulation.
VIII. Russia’s Expanding Map of Aggression
A non-exhaustive list of countries and territories where Russia has invaded or maintained hostile military presence since 1992 includes:
- Ukraine (2014 Crimea, 2022 invasion)
- Georgia (Abkhazia & South Ossetia, 1992–2008–present)
- Moldova (Transnistria, 1992–present)
- Chechnya (1994–2009)
- Syria (2015–present)
- African nations (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger via Africa Corps)
IX. A Pattern of Betrayal and Coercion
Across every theater — from Eastern Europe to the Caucasus, from the Middle East to Africa — the pattern is unmistakable:
- Russia signs agreements, then violates them when it gains leverage.
- It uses peace processes to stall, regroup, or justify aggression.
- It occupies territories long after ceasefires, turning peacekeeping into permanent control.
This strategy has devastated trust in international diplomacy. Treaties have become hollow unless enforced, and Russia’s neighbors have learned that security must be defended, not promised.
X. Why It Matters Today
As Ukraine resists a full-scale invasion, and as Russia tightens its grip on occupied territories, this history proves one thing: Only enforceable, collective security guarantees have meaning. The world must reject illusions of trust when dealing with a regime that sees diplomacy not as peace, but as war by other means.
